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                          Nations are not nourished by the men charged with  
  governing them, but by the men of who nations are 
made…. In civil society, both moral and political  
Forces are on the side of those ... million men hardened  
to all kinds of labor, and possessing al kinds of knowledge,  
are unquestionably stronger than the few hundred who  
govern them (Adam Smith, quoted in Palmer, 1997:155-156).    
 
… power is everywhere diffuse … and, when we conceive  
of resistance to that power, it should not be as a centralized  
and univocal force, as if emanating from the subject. There  
is no power without resistance. Michel Foucault, ‘Society  
Must be Defended’: Lectures at the College of France,  
1975-1976, trans. David Macey (New York: Picador, 2003). 
 
…it is people who shape and determine the destiny of the  
contradiction of the good and the bad. Once the leadership  
of the state forgets … that it is a servant of all those who  
comprise its population … then no citizen has the  
obligation of obedience to such a regime (Maku wa Mutua 
in EHRCO, 1995: v – ix). 
 
1. Introduction 
 The above three quotes capture the kernel issue in the controversial subject that 
looks at state society relations in less well off countries. The extent to which this relation 
between the two arms of society, civil society and the state, is amicable or not may likely 
determine the positive and/or negative processes that are put in place to either move 
society forward or roll back some of the gains it makes in terms of good governance and 
overall development. The state, by virtue of its command over resources and dubiously 
established legal right to protect public order and constitutional authority, in many 
instances, imposes its wills on the majority despite the existence of a good deal of 
opposition expressed in public and private meetings and in and outside forums. 
 Africa, the continent that is unusually trailing behind democratization and socio-
economic development, is actively caught in this quagmire with a very slim chance of 
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getting out of the mess in the foreseeable future. This short paper, attempts to examine 
the place of civil society vis-a-vis the all-powerful position of the state in Ethiopia. It will 
first define the concepts of civil society and the sate and some of the theories that are 
advanced to determine the place of each within the framework of society. It will then use 
the concepts of trust, partnership, complementrity and competition between the state and 
civil society in moving the institutional and material development of their nations.  
Finally, it will point out cases of opportunism that characterizes the illusive state that 
manipulates groups, institutions and material resources to consolidate power and exercise 
control.  
 Trust is an important facet in building civil society. There must be a degree of 
trust between the state and civil society. Both parties need to respect the national 
constitution, for instance. The state and civil society, two major institutions of society, 
should be partners in the expediting social progress and transformation as well as in the 
defense of their country. The amount of public money that the state apportions in order to 
“…offer the components for people to construct viable strategies of survival” (Migdal 
1988: 281) accords trust on the state. 
 The two institutions do have responsibilities that are defined by law. But they are 
partners in progress – engagement in programs of development and national defense 
makes them so. Their partnership is an essential precondition for achieving substantive 
results. 
 Each of the two institutions cannot be apart from the other. There are 
complementarities in what they do. There are certain jobs that each does individually or 
ones that they should confront cooperatively. One such area is defense. In times of danger 
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the state mobilizes society and civil society should come together and respond to the 
national call, or in nationalistic jargon, defense of the motherland. So also is this 
complementary responsibility relevant to carrying out development programs and 
projects that cannot move forward without synchronizing the joint efforts of the two. This 
is an evidence of such a positive move.  
 A degree of competition between the two also produces beneficial results. It is 
only a healthy element that needs stressing. For instance, a civil societal group may take 
the initiative to promote education in an area where the state may have not ventured or 
areas it does not wish to be involved in. Such an initiative would prompt the state to 
engage in activities that are in the immediate need categories of activities of 
communities. This sets a precedent that may be copied. 
  Since civil society in particular uses the factor of social capital of 
interconnectedness, there must be a degree of trust between its members too in order to 
upgrade the level of achievement of the solidity. According to Fukuyama (1995: 7-14), 
trust, reciprocity and networking at the community level are seen as facilitating collective 
action in the broad sense of the term and even in economic performance. The 
communities in question may be relatively small, for example, voluntary associations or 
families. They may also involve entire societies. 
 In the first case, we speak of meso-sociological and in the second, macro-
sociological analysis (that is, when social capital operates at the level of an entire society 
to facilitate the production of collective assets such as industrialization and democracy 
(cited in Forse, Michel, “Role and Rise of Social Capital”, in Flap and Volker 2004: 255). 
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Obviously all levels of analysis are interconnected. For example, one actor’s social 
capitals benefit the actor personally, but will also be of benefit to other community 
members when they all set about producing a collective good. 
The dividedness of civil societal groups, on the one hand, and the preoccupation 
of some of the groups to win the favor of the state, on the other, encumber the envisioned 
smooth processes of democratic development and halt the sprouting of fledgling 
governance and equitable distribution of resources and the satisfaction this engenders. 
Any measure that anchors on bending such a process is sure to embed the seeds of 
destruction in state and civil society relations, and ultimately, the continuing crises of life 
for a good number of people in any society.  
The paper uses books, journal and newspaper articles on Ethiopia and others, web 
site materials and news items on the subject. Historical documents relating to Ethiopia’s 
defensive and civil wars and statements by leaders are used in the writing of the paper. 
The paper also draws on the observations of some scholars and knowledgeable people 
who discussed some of the issues raised here at the time the author was in Ethiopia years 
ago. The personal observations of the writer who was in Ethiopia during those years 
when civil society members were abused and subdued by the then rulers is also used as 
an additional supportive data for the writing of the paper. This paper reflects the initial 
thoughts of the author on the subject. It is exploratory rather than analytical. It is in fact 
more of a descriptive study. Some of the rich data that could be gathered is impeded by 
access to sources of oralcy and primary sources in Ethiopia.  The author intends to 
continue to further study the subject matter and produce a more robust written product at 
some future date. 
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2. Definition of terms 
What is civil society? Generally put, civil society is an institution that “furnishes 
the fundamental conditions of liberty in the modern world”, as Robert Fine (in Fine and 
Rae (1997) put it so well. Also according to Rudolf, civil society purveys the idea of 
‘associationalism’ that protects individuals who, if left on their own, would be singled out 
and might be subjected to a situation of abuse of rights. To use Randolph’s words: 
‘Associations empower citizens who in isolation cannot confront the state as agent and 
participant, nor create consequences within society. It is by being part of the social 
collectivities that citizens can resist, escape or influence state and society.   
Hegel’s sees it as an arena where every citizen’s interests meet, play out and 
benefit more people in society (quoted by Himmelfarb 1999: 55-56). As Himmelfrab 
rightly says, the concept of civil society was linked more with de Tocqueville who 
identified the term with association of the voluntary stripe and wrote a lot about in his 
seminal work, Democracy in America (1835 and 1840) (Ibid.). 
John Keane, a British theorist, sees civil society as a means of achieving 
democracy. He has this to say about the current positive thinking relating to the concept 
of civil society.  
 The emerging consensus that civil society is a realm of  
freedom correctly highlights its basic value as a condition  
of democracy, where there is no civil society there cannot  
be citizens with capacities to choose their identities,  
entitlements and duties within the political legal framework 
(Keane 1998: 4). 
 
Civil society then represents a segment of people who get organized within a 
supposedly free political space available for engaging in activities that promote the 
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interests of their members primarily. These interests may not necessarily be peculiar to 
one civil society or a group of them.  The issues they support may in fact be supported 
and shared by many organizations created for similar purposes. And that is why such an 
interest may have a wider context and thus have policy and implementation implications 
that (non)organic and functional links with the state.  
Structurally, many scholars see it (civil society) as a unit placed between the 
family and the state. Hegel, for instance, identifies it as an (independent) sphere where 
the interests of the family and the state are mediated. It is, in the words of Ginsborg 
(2003: 94, 97) a “form in which the values and interest of the family are counterpoised to 
the other principal moments of human association” (cited from ‘Familismo’, in Ginsborg, 
ed., Stato dell Italia, q. v., pp. 78-82). It encompasses all activities, institutions and 
relations that do not belong primarily to the private sphere or to that of the state (Ibid.). 
Seligman (1993) puts civil society, in the class of institutions ‘between the family and the 
state’ mediating between the family and the state. This important role helps to harmonize 
the conflicting demands of individual and social interests. 
The above discussions see the family and the state as separate entities linked with 
one another by the mediating role of civil society that is viewed at as a unit on its own, 
separate form the family and the state. A definition of this relationship merits some 
discussion in the context of freer spaces where both civil society and the state work in 
tandem with each other and civil society is organically linked to the family, as there is an 
interface between the memberships of the two. We will elaborate on this interface later. A 
digression into the contexts in which the concept conveniently operates is in order. The 
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concept, as it were, becomes clearer when its operability is examined in light of the 
European democratic governance experiences.   
3. Civil society and the state in the context of Western European democracies 
 Civil society in Western democracies is generally looked at as having two forms 
(Ginsborg 2003). The first form exhibits itself in “broad, spatial and relatively value-free” 
environment from where all those ‘activities, institutions that do not belong primarily to 
the private sphere or to that of the state” manifest themselves (Ginsborg 2003: 94). For 
Ginsborg, churches, political parties, firms, associations and interest groups of all kinds 
fill this vast intermediate area where civil society plays the mediator’s role in society. 
 The second form, Ginsborg argues, manifests itself in a much narrower way. In 
this type also civil society plays an intermediary role between the family and the state. 
But then, he sees that there are two sub types of political spaces where civil societies of 
different capabilities rear their heads.  These two types are defined as ‘civil’ and ‘uncivil’ 
societies. They express themselves in the socioeconomic and political spaces that either 
give grounds for entities that come out in the form of associations. These spaces allow the 
exercise of democracy and pluralism or curtail them. In the ‘civil’ form, power of varying 
nature is exercised at various nodal points. According to Ginsborg, “horizontal 
solidarities, healthy debate and autonomy of judgment, conformity and obedience” are 
the specific features that take centrality in this particular type. He quotes Michael Walzer 
to specify the definitions of the terms he uses. 
 In any democratic society individuals are viewed as weak entities and hence 
incapable of being self-sufficient. The way Walzer sees it:  
  The citizens of a democratic state are not, in this view 
self-sufficient creatures. They must be members elsewhere,  
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in smaller, more accessible, less demanding, less dangerous  
place than the modern state. For only in such places can they 
acquire political competence, learn to win and lose, learn to  
compromise, make friends and allies, explore oppositional  
ideas (Ginsborg 2003: 95) 
 
Ginsborg chooses to use the term civil society in the context of the second 
definition in his discussion of the role of civil societal groups in the Italian politico-social 
structures that he penned in his work titled: “Italy and its Discontents: Family, Civil 
Society, State: 1980 – 2001”. He warns though that the idealization of civil society to a 
point where it is seen as a substitute to the state is incorrect. 
 Ginsborg’s definitions of the concept are quite perceptive. But rather than 
capturing the whole politico-social and economic spectrums of societal life in which civil 
society is involved, it limits this involvement to the political as his operationalization of 
the concept above amply demonstrates. The definition used in this paper is more 
encompassing and covers key aspects of socio-economic and political lives where civil 
society intermingles and interfaces in more activities than the above definitions capture.  
The family and civil society cannot be seen as different entities as Ginsborg and 
other writers argue. There are times when the two are fused with one another. At other 
times also the two show distinctive characteristics. When family members limit their 
activities to the sole promotion of their private interests, they will not have much to do 
with civil society, near and far. But when their interests have some affinity with those of 
other families and these interests can be articulated along with those of the other families, 
then they can do this better by associating with those other families who have similar 
interests.  
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 Civil society then is an association of people who are interconnected with one 
another and work to promote their immediate and long-term interests. Their immediate 
interests revolve around the accomplishment of the missions and objectives of their 
specific organization, whether they are social, economic or political. They also need to 
chart ways of interacting and/or protruding into activities that have wider implications 
with regard to the broader national policies and legal issues that would have further 
implications for their smooth growth and development.  
As much as families and civil societal groups are connected with one another, so 
are families and the state in some cases. In fact, in less developed country contexts state 
power is constructed around a power base of a few or more families. In traditional 
Ethiopia, for instance, the imperial family conveniently spread its tentacles in an effort to 
reach out to other families in order to expand its power and legitimacy bases trough the 
mechanism of marriage or God-fatherly or –motherly relations.  
The same kinds of relationships were continued in post-imperial Ethiopia. Many 
families within the power structure of the Derg, the military-socialist junta that was one 
of the motors behind the removal of the imperial political order, was rife with such 
relationships of families to the state. The tradition has continued even today. The current 
regime is also viewed as one in which groups of families have constructed core groups 
around which power and wealth is consolidated.  
The family then interfaces with both civil society and state activities at various 
nodal points in the social, economic and political spheres. While the three entities, as 
conceptually categorized into three different groups, show distinctive characteristics, the 
observable interfaces between them demonstrate the contexts in which power is diffused 
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and interests are promoted and maintained at certain critical points within the whole 
system. On this count, the interlinked families, civil societal groups and the state become 
a unity where more benefits accrue to rather smaller groups of cunning persons.   
 Families and civil societal groups are then intimately connected with the state, an 
entity that is ‘empowered,’ or better still empowers itself by sheer power, to provide 
services such as the protection of the rights of individuals and associational rights of 
citizens as well as the maintenance of order and preservation of peace to the larger 
society. The parentheses used show that governments brought to power go beyond the 
parameters intended to install them in the political saddle. The state then maneuvers to 
influence both the family and civil societal groups. It has more latitude to establish closer 
relations with both groups by virtue of its command over resources. 
In this paper, I see the family, as a sub set of civil society, unlike theorists and 
analysts like Ginsborg, Hegel and Alexis De Tocqueville who consider civil society as an 
entity that is apart from the family whose interests are in part mediated by civil society in 
relation to the state.  The family is in many ways the source of the members that 
constitute civil society itself as well as those of the state. 
 Unlike the theorists and analysts like Ginsborg, Hegel, Montesquieu and others, I 
like to see civil society in a broader context. Civil society is an all-encompassing concept 
that also embodies the family. There are two reasons for this categorization.  
First, civil society can be represented by small or big organizations. The source of 
the membership can be the family. Members of one family and/or many more that band 
together create a coalition to promote their common interests and those of others beyond 
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the family. As both an entity apart from civil society and as a member of it, the family, 
for all intents and purposes, can be a mediator in the relations between ‘it and the state’. 
 This dual role makes it a key institution for its own sake. Civil society is then an 
institution that does the job of mediation on its behalf or one that joins hands with other 
collectivities or solidities at one and the same time to undertake enumerable tasks and 
attain some desired goal. They also go beyond the immediate need loop and facilitate the 
emergence of structures and processes that could lay the groundwork for the future. 
Secondly, individuals on their own or as family members come together to create 
blocks to vote in or out political parties, members of the judiciary and other public 
officials during elections. Here also they could pick a candidate(s) or party that would 
speak(s) to the issues that matter most to them – including ones that somehow positively 
affect their interests. 
 Civil society is thus an important institution the roles of which are essential to all 
members of society. Unlike an administration or broadly a specific state at a point in time 
that benefits members of its own party and supporters, civil society plays a freer role 
when it comes to the distribution of benefits to infinitely more members that it represents. 
That is why the state should listen to what civil society has to say and support the 
activities that it engages itself in. That is why civil society has to play a more 
fundamental role of counseling and demanding the state to behave properly and provide 
equally to all members or groups of the society without any partiality.  
Although this is an ideal approach to organize the relationships between the 
family and civil society as well as the state, the tendency is to uphold the power of the 
state and minimize the role of civil society in assuming a stronger position in the styles of 
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decision-making processes society chooses to put in place for itself. This is done more by 
the state itself than civil societal groups that more or less hold similar views on the roles 
of good governance as a means of building a fair social system.  
The state engages in manipulative practices with the support of individuals and 
civil societal groups that ally with it to assure its dominance over society. It becomes an 
all too powerful entity that tramples on the rights of citizens and imposes its will on the 
people. The net outcome of this is an unabated foray into the realm of civil society where 
it freely bestows privileges and rights to its members and retainers at the helm of the 
political system at any one time. Disfranchisement of civil societies and other groups is 
the inevitable result of this partisan distribution of rights and access to all kinds of 
resources. This is a major source of poverty, abuse and ‘desecration’ of the rights of other 
members of society who are out of the loops of power that the state conveniently 
constructs in order to dominate life in the society. 
4. Civil society and views about the place of the state in Ethiopia 
The relationship between civil societies and the state in Ethiopia as in many 
underdeveloped democracies has been one of subordination of the first by the second. 
This culturally determined and politically imposed value had been tacitly supported by 
large number of families and civil societal groups. It is also this factor that elevated the 
state and minimized the creative and constructive roles civil society should play at all 
levels of the social system.  
The all-powerful position of the sovereign and the place/station of civil society 
groups and indeed the general population are expressed in a segment of the oral history of 
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the people. The following Amharic couplets, for instance, purvey the roots and the 
essence of such power imbalance between the state and civil society. 
Original  Semay Aytares,  
   Negus aykeses,  
Trans:  The sky cannot be plowed, 
And the ‘negus’ (the embodiment of the state) cannot be taken to 
court. 
Another Tigrigna couplet stamps this relationship by the forlorn view that people (the 
potential electors) often express. 
Original Zewetsa tsehay, tsahyna,  
The negese negus negusna 
   Trans:  A sun that rises any day/time is our sun and  
  Any king that is anointed or rises to power is our king.  
 
 The couplets above show that society, civil society, in particular, considered the 
ruler as the be all and end all persona whose power could not be contested. Civil society 
under these circumstances has given up or relinquished its power to the sovereign 
unquestioningly. 
The state’s and society’s roles in the execution of national duties and 
responsibilities do not show complimentarity in this sense. The state has been there to 
dictate and civil society to carry out the will of the sovereign, be this one person or a 
group manipulated by him, at all times.  
An institution that was of significant importance in Ethiopian political life was 
also the ‘mehal Sefari’ (an Amharic word) or the ‘constituent assembly’ of kingmakers. 
This group was the one that selected Ras Teferi as the Regent and/crown prince of 
Ethiopia during the reign of Empress Zewditu. It was a strong civil societal group that 
played the role of a consultative body in the selection of an/the appropriate national 
leader. This particular body was used most effectively by Fitawrari Habet Giorgis, one of 
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the few and sagacious war generals, the Emperor Menilik produced during his reign. He 
presided over the election of the regent and/or crown prince of Ethiopia. 
This constituent/consultative body met on the request of Habte Giorgis in order to 
select one person from among those born into the Solomonic Dynasty. The body initially 
met at Jan Meda, the grand/giant field located in Addis Ababa. They were asked to 
consult with one another and select the best of the royal family members as the crown 
prince of Ethiopia.  
The mehal sefari members were themselves important personalities/citizens of 
Addis Ababa. They were unable to come up with the right person for the position. Habte 
Giorgis added three more days so the group may be able to find the right person for the 
vacant position of the regent. The additional three days passed by, but the electors came 
empty handed again. Habte Giorgis was determined to extend the consultation time of the 
body by another set of three days so they would search and pick the appropriate regent. 
This time, however, they were able to show up with one name. The mehal sefari-elected 
personality, unlike the elect of God, which was widely used by many and constantly 
made reference to later on many occasions by the leader himself, was Ras Teferi or, later, 
Haile Selassie Selassie I. The full reference of the selection was, nevertheless, attributed 
to God instead of the mehal sefari.   
The mehal sefari was a unique institution that was mandated to search for and 
elect the right person for the position of the regency and/or the crown prince from among 
the members of the royal family or those with some affinity to them. This was an 
assembly that was an important institution in the political structure of the country at that 
point in time. Although, the mehal safari included members of the military, it could be 
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considered a civil society (notable persons and civilian members that the Zikre Neger 
(that was given the responsibility of a ‘say’ in the selection of the next leader of Ethiopia. 
The need for the selection of a leader arose because Lij Iyasu, the de facto 
emperor who was anointed leader upon the death of Emperor Menilik, was totally in 
disagreement with the nobility and Menilik’s generals who saw that he went against the 
traditions of the country’s governance system. He moved from place to place in the 
country, established relations with religious groups that were not mainstream by the 
standards then and desecrated the throne by marrying into other religious, particularly 
Muslims, groups and involving himself in widespread concubine relations. 
The nobility found out that he was not ruling the country in the best interest of 
Ethiopia and sought to remove him. That was why the election body was established, 
perhaps for the first time in Ethiopian history. The usual practice was to follow a strong 
man who builds his power base from scratch, such as Emperor Tewodros or win battles 
against arch foes and proceed to the Gibi or the Imperial Palace. But this time around, 
important personalities connected with one another and set up the first election body in 
the country. 
Civil society, therefore, reared its head and took its rightful place at this point in 
time in Ethiopia’s history. This should serve as a benchmark for the institution of such a 
practice in order to resolve some of the claims that election procedures that marred 
society in recent years. In this context, a parallel can be drawn between Mehal Sefari and 
the electoral college of the United States. It can be revived and remodeled for electing a 
segment of the public officials for the country. 
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5. Wars and dangers to the loss of national sovereignty and compatible relations 
between the state and civil society 
One major instance where amity between the two – civil society and the state --
takes center stage is when the power of the ruler is challenged by particularly foreign 
forces. The emperors who ruled Ethiopia before the accession of the heads of state after 
them (Mengistu and Melese) used the forces of civil society to maintain the sovereignty 
of their country. All appealed to the people to follow them and pin down the intruders.  
Their appeals to members of civil society were also framed in the form of requests 
to the people unlike periods of peace in which life goes on with relatively little challenge 
if any to the power base of the rulers. These are manifested in the ‘civil’ ways they 
treated their subjects and aroused their patriotism to defend their country – their wife, 
land and their religion, the interests that were basic to the individual.  
Emperor Yohannes IV’s war proclamation carried the following appeal to the 
people to defend their country:  
Oh, ye children of Ethiopia, pay attention!  
Ethiopia is your mother,  
Ethiopia is your crown,  
Ethiopia is your wife, 
Ethiopia is you child, 
Ethiopia is your tomb, 
So, therefore, love of mother, 
Honor of the crown, 
Kindness of the wife, 
Joy of children 
Respect for the tomb, are central values/ 
important principles that should be  
embedded in your/Ethiopian self. 
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 He called upon the people to fight the enemy that threatened to destroy these 
critical Ethiopian values/principles in his general mobilization order for the war (Deutche 
Welle, German Radio, Evening Show, June 28, 2007). 
Emperor Menilik likewise appealed to his people to defend their country in the 
late 1880s when Italian imperialists were preparing to colonize his country. His appeals 
to the defense and civilian populations were couched in patriotic terms. The words of the 
proclamation he issued for the general mobilization were expressed in the following way: 
Those of you who are capable adults need  to go to the war 
Front and help me fight the enemy. Those of you who are  
disabled and incapable of going to the front, pray for me.  
You all must fight in defense of your religion, your flag  
(the emblem of your sovereignty), your land and your wife.  
If you fail to fight for your country, you will be condemned  
by the almighty and future generations of your countrymen.  
(See Meheteme Selassie, Zikra Nagar, 1942). 
 
 Emperor Haile Selassie’s general mobilization decree also appealed to the people 
in no less fervent manner. It read: 
 
  My fellow Ethiopians! You know that Ethiopian sovereignty  
  had not been violated since the time of Menilik I. A people  
that is colonized is dispossessed of their lands and are turned  
into tenants who become victims and on-lookers of those  
foreigners who exclusively use the resources of the country 
for their own good. A people who are so enslaved pass their  
defeat to their offspring. Join me in the defense of our country  
and defeat the enemy that is intent on enslaving us.  
(Declaration of War, issued by Emperor Haile Selassie,  
Meskerem (September) 1928 E. C.: 276-79, translated from  
the Amharic version by the author of this paper).  
 
Mengistu also saw the fight against secessionists as a problem rooted in foreign 
interests over Ethiopian resources. In his speech, Adis Zemen, April 17, 1976, he 
indicated that the fight was against:  
 
“imperialism, feudalism and bureaucratic capitalism …  
(waged) by the masses of the Ethiopian people. The  
masses are engaged in actions that liberate them from 
the grips of feudalism, imperialism and bureaucratic 
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capitalism. 
 
 Meles, the current leader of Ethiopia, also underlined the fact that the people of 
Ethiopia made a difference in defeating Eritrea which he said appeared to believe that it 
was only the government that was informed about the aggression that that country 
(Eritrea) perpetrated. The highlights of the statements he made read as follows: 
 
Looking back at the outbreak of the war, it is very  
possible that Mr. Issayias never expected this type 
of response (repulsion of the aggressors) from  
the Ethiopian people. He felt that the first  
information about the incursion into Badme, 
Irob, Zalanbesa, Bure and Bada would have been  
limited to the government of Ethiopia. It was not  
surprising to Mr. Issayias to have expected that  
the Ethiopian people would have limited access to 
the information about the invasion. (Refer to  
http://www.ethiopia first.com/news/2000/new613/html).  
  
 The emperors and the subsequent two leaders, who occupied the ‘throne’ in 
Ethiopia during the past few decades, gave prominence to the importance of the people 
and their participation in saving their country’s sovereignty and its independence. The 
celebration and high value given to the peoples’ cooperation is lauded as the declarations 
and statements made by the leaders indicate. In fact, each of these leaders literally begged 
the people to go to the war fronts and stop the aggressors.  
6. Reversion to state dominance of civil society after dangers to sovereignty are over  
Once the wars ended, however, the leaders reverted to their usual practices of 
subduing the same people – civil society members, in other words, once again. They 
considered the people as a mass that needed to be led rather than partnered with in the 
fight against processes that conspire against their best interests, interests that entailed an 
improvement in their livelihoods. 
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Civil societal groups were active in a limited set of social and economic activities 
like ‘equb’ (kitty), ‘idir’ (burial associations) and ‘debo’ (exchange of labor in rural 
contexts) activities that constituted the foundations of their livelihood. There were no 
significant politically motivated civil societal groups that emerged to create a niche for 
themselves and act to influence the political process in Ethiopia’s history. If there were, 
they were certainly the exception than the rule. These were the domain of disgruntled 
‘conspirators’ who were either wronged by the sovereign or a governor/state official 
somewhere in the political and social hierarchy and these were summarily dealt with (a) 
blow. What were known as ‘shiftas’ or outlaws did sometimes influence decisions. The 
outlaws were either appointed or compensated for the losses they sustained following 
also the wrong decisions made by political structures somewhere in the hierarchy and 
possibly hurt them. They, in many cases, were thus effectively integrated back into the 
system which was assumedly made functional once again. 
The Ethiopian state and civil society also communicated indirectly with one 
another. A case in point was the unofficial relationship Emperor Menilik established with 
the public. He is said to have frequently posed the question: “What does the shepherd 
sing’ at this point of time?” Shepherds were then thought of as agents of the people, who 
expressed the injustices perpetrated by officials and the corruptions that they were 
embroiled in. The Emperor Menilik used the songs as sounding boards for gathering 
public opinion that he employed for remedial outputs/decisions. 
Emperor Haile Selassie used a different format. He gave direct access, though 
unofficial, to citizens asking for remedial decisions. People, personally or in groups, 
submitted papers relating to the wrongs they were subjected to wherever they found the 
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emperor — at the church, while taking a walk or slowly driving in the streets. There have 
been instances where aggrieved people who lay their ‘shemas’ (overalls or dungarees) or 
white clothes in the middle of the street and appealed for justice. Whether or not all or 
only some of the remedial decisions were accorded or justice was served through this 
appeal format would not be easily ascertained. But this narration gives a birds eye view 
of one of the styles Emperor Haile Selassie used to publicly communicate with 
individuals or groups among his people who were aggrieved by his officials.  
During the time of the student protests in the 1960s, the Emperor addressed 
parents and other residents that he invited to this palace and asked them to talk to their 
children so they can stop their public ‘disturbances’. The crowds of parents and residents 
who met with him were meant to serve as representatives of civil society and the 
assumption was that others who were not physically there would do likewise, meaning 
advise their children to let peace prevail.  
Menilk’s public mood measurement and data gathering through the expressed 
songs of the shepherd and Haile Selassie’s relaying of the state’s wishes through groups 
of parents and residents were smart methods of communication with the public or civil 
society. But these approaches were replaced with totally different ones that went in 
unexpected directions after the departure of the monarchy. The governments that 
sequentially replaced the emperors knew of no conciliatory discourses involving peaceful 
dialogues with aggrieved parties or other interest groups. 
The ‘Derg’, the military junta and the EPRDF, the rebel junta, knew no ‘civil’ 
communication with civil society. Yes, initially they approached civil societal groups and 
talked to them ‘civilly’ as far as it went. The idea behind their meetings with civil societal 
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groups was, however, to convince them to accept the governments’ lines of thinking or 
their ideologies. The meetings, in both cases were public relation stunts to convince the 
public and to satisfy their (the rulers’) egos involving self-adulation of the rulers and the 
maintenance of their power by all means. 
In actual fact, the end results of such meetings were decided in advance. After the 
meetings, the states hatched eggs of destroying civil societal groups. Both the Derg and 
the EPRDF imprisoned their so-called enemies or eliminated them. The governments’ 
actions could be summarized with the following powerful words that involved defiance, 
‘my way or the highway.’  
In the case of the Derg, for instance, the ‘doyen’ labor union, the Confederation of 
Ethiopian Labor Unions (CELU) that posed an imminent danger to the power of the 
military government was sidetracked and marginalized. Smaller associations of workers 
including homemaker servants or service givers were aggressively organized to counter 
the powers of CELU. Urban dwellers associations and farmers associations were quickly 
set up to further marginalize CELU. This seemed to work for the Derg. But soon after all 
the fanfare, the need to interact with civil society was totally abandoned when the 
realization that the state assured itself of its domination of the political sphere seemed to 
be in place or established firmly. 
The space civil society held was later taken over by oppositional groups, which 
penetrated the same institutions seeking the support of the members. Those individuals 
and groups that responded to the call were involved in bitter oppositional politicking and 
large numbers of them were consumed by the revolution. Among those who were 
eliminated by the red terror were some of the brightest sons and daughters of the country. 
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Soon after the white terror (opposition) and red terror (that of the Derg) that fully 
engaged the two political enemies (the state and opposition groups), civil societal 
activities were reduced to their minimum in their intensity. The marginal independence 
civil society enjoyed from time to time was reduced to the dustbins of history. A 
relatively quiet and unhealthy period of silence befell the country. 
Civil societal activity picked a few threads here and there to help the all-powerful 
dictatorial government (state), the Derg, that hoisted the banner of reasserting the 
sovereignty of a united Ethiopia whose dismemberment was imminent from the attacks of 
forces of dissention in the South East and the North of the country during the 1970s and 
1980s. Civil societal groups like the ‘edirs’ (burial societies) were compelled to provide 
items such as tents, they used for their daily routine services. These items/were forcibly 
shipped to military training camps. Urban and rural residents were asked to contribute 
material and human services (recruits) toward the defense of the motherland. Civil 
servants were required to contribute a tenth of their salaries and wages to combat the 
secessionist wars and Somalian aggression. Women’s groups organized ‘yenat ager teri’ 
or ‘motherland’s calls’ festivals at which funds for the war effort were raised.  
All this effort ended up bearing some fruit in the eyes of the military government 
for a while. A semblance of unity as it was known was restored for the country amid 
fights that alternated challenges and dangers of divisibility and unity. But forces of 
division in the parlance of ‘unitarists’ got the upper hand and were soon replaced by 
forces that proclaimed an Ethiopia that entertained the ‘nominal’ idea of unity in 
diversity.  
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The Ethiopian Peoples Revolutionary Democratic Party (EPRDF) attained the 
mantra of power in this topsy-turvy situation. Like its predecessor, EPRDF also 
attempted to entice civil society into the ideological loop that it planted for the society. 
When civil societal groups like the University Teachers Association that refused to pull 
itself into the EPRDF loop came into the picture, they were harshly dealt with. A large 
number of association members were summarily dismissed from their jobs and/or were 
retired.  
In other cases, parallel organizations such as those of the Ethiopian Teachers 
Association and the Ethiopian Journalists Association were created. The state thus set one 
civil society against another to diffuse the power of the one that posed a threat to its rule. 
Civil society, divided against itself, thus benefited the state by its own actions in favor of 
division. The beneficiary of all this contrived division inevitably was the state. 
Incidentally, it is this very state that did not want to see any opposition worthy of the 
name to work for its membership and other aggrieved groups in society. 
In this situation, segments of civil societal units supported the state and other units 
joined hands with the state to tip the balance in favor of the dominant state. An ‘unfree’ 
society was thus immersed in a political struggle that involved ‘uncivil’ modalities. 
Temporarily, the beneficiary of the outcomes of such a struggle is obviously the state, the 
EPRDF at this point in time. 
But this is not a win-win situation for the state. It is a ‘win now’ and eventually a 
‘lose-lose’ situation for the state later. In such an electrified political struggle no one 
group wins unless reconciliatory measures of sorts are taken. All such strenuous exertions 
channel the crown jewel of all the parties into unproductive processes and outcomes. 
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This unwise choice has led to a further impoverishment of the country. Official 
figures speak of a healthy growth for the country in economic terms. But social 
conditions measured against the indices of growth tell the tale of economic pulverization. 
The cost of living index is rising at an astronomic rate. This is no good news to both civil 
society and the state that perforce need to work in harmony with some sense of wisdom. 
In the end a healthy cooperation and complementary effort by both helps frontline 
membership of political and civil societies and the larger society, and if you will, the 
silent majority. 
8. Optional routes that can harmonize the relationships between civil society and the 
state. 
The relationship between the state and civil society in Ethiopia needs a more 
serious rethinking. The confrontational stance exhibited by both should be loosened. The 
state is the pariah organization behind this unhealthy struggle. Its declared intention of 
subduing civil society is fraught with ill will the motto of which is the disfranchisement 
of this critical arm of society – civil society. The idea behind the use of arsenals of 
suppression of civil society by the state is to enfeeble the sprouting of democracy in 
Ethiopia 
The power of civil society, whether this is actual or potential, is its members’ 
number. Number (of people) may not mean much when the struggle of civil society is at 
the beginning stages. But any civil society can empower itself better over time if the 
struggle is handled in a systematic manner. This can be achieved through unity in 
diversity and persistence, which has been the hallmark of the struggle that Ethiopian 
teachers, journalists, Ethiopian bank employees as well as Ethiopian students put up in 
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their struggle to limit the untamed power of the state against all odds over a decade and a 
half. 
The current civil societal struggle should be fortified by economic and social 
organizations representing ‘idirs’ and ‘equibs’ as well as familial association that started 
to mushroom beginning four decades ago in Addis in particular. Urban dwellers and 
farmers associations need to reassert their rights to reorganize themselves and seek 
participation in the mediation of their interests vis-à-vis the state. 
Civil societal groups at home and abroad should put together their human and 
material resources behind this effort. Coordination of activities by these organizations is 
an essential component of the struggle that aims at solidifying the power of civil society. 
A weakened civil society accords strength to a weaning and abusive state.  
A subdued civil society, in other words, is not in the best interest of society and 
that of itself. The state is strengthened when it finds out civil society is emaciated. 
Generally speaking, civil society is befriended when a foreign threat is imminent or when 
it is actuated.  
It is not only during times of war, as we saw earlier in this paper,  that civil 
society should be befriended or even begged to join hands with the state. In times of 
peace also it should be given its rightful space that it needs to promote its multiple and 
diverse interests. 
A developing country like Ethiopia has not only been faced by foreign aggressors, 
which tried to bust her sovereignty from time to time. Beyond such foreign aggressors 
and internal power mongers, there remains an illusive enemy that had firmly entrenched 
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itself. This enemy poses an eternal challenge to the society and it will continue to pose 
the same danger in the future too. 
This powerful enemy is no other than poverty ad its attendant manifestations that 
exhibit themselves in the form of pestilence and ill health.  The two together sap the 
strengths of the people who should otherwise be able to be active and unleash all their 
powers toward growth. The state, as an institution invested with the power to help 
facilitate this growth, should not stand in the way of such a development. One of its 
cardinal duties is to create the necessary environment for the people or civil society to 
freely organize and take the initiatives to help itself.  
The state would do well if it partners with strengthened civil societies rather than 
weakened ones. The national interest and democratization would be served better if a 
genuine effort is made by the state not to pin down the struggles civil societies make to 
empower themselves. Other social, economic and professional associations should be 
given the right to organize and help civil society. The state or the polity that constitutes it 
is not an institution that would stay forever. But social and other institutions stay much 
longer and they represent the true interests of individuals and groups that continue to be 
there for all times.   
Whatever its nature any polity that constitutes a government, would go after a 
time – a limited time -- or through violent changes. When there is a semblance of 
democracy and regular elections the transition exhibits orderly transfers of power. In 
dictatorial and authoritarian state systems, however, governments stay longer bleeding 
the large majority of the people.  But both types of governments go away in the end.  
 28 
Moreover, people who serve civil societal interests are proximate to the people 
they serve. They do little to subdue their membership’s interests since they work under 
the watchful eyes of their members. They are better positioned to work for the common 
good. The state, however, far removed from the nitty-gritty of everyday life, becomes an 
institution that tends to paternalize one group against the best interests of other social and 
economic groups that do not see the world its way.  
Strengthened civil societies are better disposed to work for their membership and 
others rather than a state that is far removed from the constructive activities that civil 
societies manage to create for their membership and the larger society. A free political 
space for civil society provides an assured way of creating a functional rather than a 
dysfunctional society where stability and harmony take center stage and the best interest 
of all are served. 
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